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I; 



LIBERTY TRACTS NUMBER FOUR 



THE 
POLICY of IMPERIALISM 



j^ddress hy 
HON. CARL SCHURZ 

At the Anti-Imperialist Conference in Chicago 
October 17, 1899 



CHICAGO : 

AMERICAN ANTI-IMPERIALISTIC LEAGUE 
i8gg 



,s 



51723 



THE POLICY OF IMPERIALISM. 



More than eight months ago I had the honor of addressing the 
citizens of Chicago on the subject of American imperiaUsm, meaning 
the poUcy of annexing to this repubUc distant countries and aUen 
populations that will not fit into our democratic system of govern- 
ment. I discussed at that time mainly the baneful effect the pursuit 
of an imperialistic policy would produce upon our political institu- 
tions. After long silence, during which I have carefully reviewed my 
own opinions, as well as those of others in the light of the best infor- 
mation I could obtain, I shall now approach the same subject from 
another point of view. 

We all know that the popular mind is much disturbed by the 
Philippine war, and that, however highly we admire the bravery of 
our soldiers, nobody professes to be proud of the war itself. There 
are few Americans who do not frankly admit their regret that this 
war should ever have happened. I think I risk nothing when I say 
that it is not merely the bungling conduct of military operations, but 
a serious trouble of conscience, that disturbs the American heart 
about this war, and that this trouble of conscience will not be allayed 
by a more successful military campaign, just as fifty years ago the 
trouble of conscience about slavery could not be allayed by any com- 
promise. 

Many people now, as the slavery compromisers did then, try to 
ease their minds by saying: "Well, we are in it, and now we must 
do the best we can." In spite of the obvious futility of this cry in 
some respects, I will accept it with the one proviso, that we make an 
honest effort to ascertain what really is the best we can do. To this 
end let us first clearly remember what has happened. 

In April, 1898, we went to war with Spain for the avowed pur- 
pose of liberating the people of Cuba, who had long been struggling 
for freedom and independence. Our object in that war was clearly 
and emphatically proclaimed by a solemn resolution of Congress 
repudiating all intention of annexation on our part, and declaring 
that the Cuban people " are, and of right ought to be, free and inde- 
pendent." This solemn declaration was made to do justice to the 
spirit of the American people, who were indeed willing to wage a war 
of liberation, but would not have consented to a war of conquest. It 
was also to propitiate the opinion of mankind for our action. Presi- 
dent McKinley also declared with equal solemnity that annexation 
by force could not be thought of, because, according to our code of 
morals, it would be " criminal aggression." 

Can it justly be pretended that these declarations referred only 
to the island of Cuba? What would the American people, what 



would the world have said, if Congress had resolved that the Cuban 
people were indeed rightfully entitled to freedom and independence, 
but that as to the people of other Spanish colonies we recognized no 
such right ; and if President McKinley had declared that the forcible 
annexation of Cuba would be criminal, but that the forcible annex- 
ation of other Spanish colonies would be a righteous act ? A general 
outburst of protest from our own people, and of derision and con- 
tempt from the whole world, would have been the answer. No, there 
can be no cavil — that war was proclaimed to all mankind to be a 
war of liberation, and not of conquest, and even now our very impe- 
rialists are still boasting that the war was prompted by the most 
unselfish and generous purposes, and that those insult us who do not 
believe it. 

In the course of that war Commodore Dewey, by a brilliant feat 
of arms, destroyed the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Manila. This 
did not change the heralded character of the war — certainly not in 
Dewey's own opinion. The Filipinos, constituting the strongest and 
foremost tribe of the population of the archipelago, had long been 
fighting for freedom and independence, just as the Cubans had. The 
great mass of the other islanders sympathized with them. They 
fought for the same cause as the Cubans, and they fought against the 
same enemy — the same enemy against whom we were waging our 
war of humanity and liberation. They had the same title to freedom 
and independence which we recognized as " of right " in the Cubans — 
nay, more ; for, as Admiral Dewey telegraphed to our government, 
"they are far superior in their intelligence, and more capable of self- 
government that the natives of Cuba." The Admiral adds : " I am 
familiar with both races, and further intercourse with them has con- 
firmed me in this opinion." 

Indeed, the mendacious stories spread by our imperialists which 
represent those people as barbarians, their doings as mere "sav- 
agery," and their chiefs as no better than " cut-throats," have been 
refuted by such a mass of authoritative testimony, coming in part 
from men who are themselves imperialists, that their authors should 
hide their heads in shame; for surely, it is not the part of really brave 
men to calumniate their victims before sacrificing them. We need 
not praise the Filipinos as in every way the equals of the " embattled 
farmers " of Lexington and Concord, and Aguinaldo as the peer of 
Washington ; but there is an overwhelming abundance of testimony, 
some of it unwilling, that the Filipinos are fully the equals, and even 
the superiors, of the Cubans and the Mexicans. As to Aguinaldo, 
Admiral Dewey is credited with saying that he is controlled by men 
abler than himself. The same could be said of more than one of our 
Presidents. Moreover, it would prove that those are greatly mistaken 
who predict that the Filipino uprising would collapse were Aguinaldo 
captured or killed. The old slander that Aguinaldo had sold out the 
revolutionary movement for a bribe of $ 400,000 has been so 
thoroughly exploded by the best authority that it requires uncommon 
audacity to repeat it. (See Senate Doc. 62 ; page 421.) 



Now let us see what has happened. Two months before the 
beginning of our Spanish war, our Consul at Manila reported to the 
state department: " Conditions here and in Cuba are practically alike. 
War exists, battles are of almost daily occurrence. The crown 
forces (Spanish) have not been able to dislodge a rebel army within 
ten miles of Manila. A republic is organized here as in Cuba." 
When two months later our war of liberation and humanity began, 
Commodore Dewey was at Hong Kong with his ships. He received 
orders to attack and destroy the Spanish fleet in those waters. It 
was then that our Consul-General at Singapore informed our State 
Department that he had conferred with General Aguinaldo, then at 
Singapore, as to the cooperation of the Philippine insurgents, and that 
he had telegraphed to Commodore Dewey that Aguinaldo was willing 
to come to Hong Kong to arrange with Dewey for " general coopera- 
tion, if desired"; whereupon Dewey promptly answered: "Tell Agui- 
naldo come soon as possible." The meeting was had. Dewey sailed 
to Manila to destroy the Spanish fleet, and Aguinaldo was taken to the 
seat of war on a vessel of the United States. His forces received a 
supply of arms through Commodore Dewey, and did faithfully and 
effectively cooperate with our forces against the Spaniards, so effect- 
ively, indeed, that soon afterwards by their efforts the Spaniards had 
lost the whole country, except a few garrisons in which they were 
practically blockaded. 

Now, what were the relations between the Philippine insurgents 
and this republic ? There is some dispute as to certain agreements, 
including a promise of Philippine independence, said to have been 
made between Aguinaldo and our Consul-General at Singapore, before 
Aguinaldo proceeded to cooperate with Dewey. But I lay no stress 
upon this point. I will let only the record of facts speak. Of these 
facts the first, of highest importance, is that Aguinaldo was "desired, " 
that is, invited, by officers of the United States to cooperate with our 
forces. The second is that the Filipino Junta in Hong Kong imme- 
diately after these conferences appealed to their countrymen to receive 
the American fleet about to sail for Manila, as friends, by a proclama- 
tion which had these words: "Compatriots, divine Providence is 
about to place independence within our reach. The Americans, not 
from any mercenary motives, but for the sake of humanity, have 
1 considered it opportune to extend their protecting mantle to our beloved 
\ country. Where you see the American flag flying, assemble in mass. 
I They are our redeemers." With this faith his followers gave Aguinaldo 
' a rapturous greeting upon his arrival at Cavite, where he proclaimed 
his government and organized his army under Dewey's eyes. 

The arrival of our land forces did not at first change these rela- 
tions. Brigadier-General Thomas M. Anderson, commanding, wrote 
to Aguinaldo, July 4, as follows : " General, I have the honor to inform 
you that the United States of America, whose land forces I have the 
honor to command, in this vicinity, being at war with the kingdom of 
Spain, has entire sympathy and most friendly sentiments for the native 
people of the Philippine Islands. For these reasons I desire to have 



the most amicable relations with you, and to have you and your 
people cooperate with us in military operations against the Spanish 
forces," etc. Aguinaldo responded cordially, and an extended corre- 
spondence followed, special services being asked for by the party of 
the first part, being rendered by the second, and duly acknowledged 
by the first. All this went on pleasantly until the capture of Manila, in 
which Aguinaldo effectively cooperated by fighting the Spaniards out- 
side, taking many prisoners from them, and hemming them in. The ser- 
vices they rendered by taking thousands of Spanish prisoners, by 
harassing the Spaniards in the trenches, and by completely blockad- 
ing Manila on the land side, were amply testified to by our own 
officers. Aguinaldo was also active on the sea. He had ships, which 
our commanders permitted to pass in and out of Manila Bay, under 
the flag of the Philippine republic, on their expeditions against other 
provinces. 

Now, whether there was or not any formal compact of alliance 
signed and sealed, no candid man who has studied the official doc- 
uments will deny that in point of fact the Filipinos, having been desired 
and invited to do so, were, before the capture of Manila, acting, and 
were practically recognized, as our allies, and that as such they did 
effective service, which we accepted and profited by. This is an 
indisputable fact, proved by the record. 

It is an equally indisputable fact that during that period the 
Filipino government constantly and publicly, so that nobody could 
plead ignorance of it or misunderstand it, informed the world that 
their object was the achievement of national independence, and that 
they believed the Americans had come in good faith to help them 
accomplish that end, as in the case of Cuba. It was weeks after 
various proclamations and other public utterances of Aguinaldo to 
that effect, that the correspondence between him and General Ander- 
son, which I have quoted, took place, and that the useful services of 
the Filipinos as our practical allies were accepted. It is, further, an 
indisputable fact that during this period our government did not 
inform the Filipinos that their fond expectations as to our recognition 
of their independence were mistaken. Our Secretary of State did, 
indeed, on June i6 write to Mr. Pratt, our Consul-General at Singa- 
pore, that our government knew the Philippine insurgents, not indeed 
as patriots struggling for liberty, and who, like the Cubans, " are and 
of right ought to be free and independent," but merely as *' discon- 
tented and rebellious subjects of Spain," who, if we occupied their 
country in consequence of the war, would have to yield us due 
"obedience." And other officers of our government were instructed 
not to make any promises to the Filipinos as to the future. But the 
Filipinos themselves were not so informed. They were left to believe 
that, while fighting in cooperation with the American forces, they were 
fighting for their own independence. They could not imagine that 
the government of the great American republic, while boasting of 
having gone to war with Spain under the banner of liberation and 
humanity in behalf of Cuba, was capable of secretly plotting to turn 



that war into one for the conquest and subjugation of the Philippines. 
Thus the FiUpinos went faithfully and bravely on doing for us the service 
of allies, of brothers in arms, far from dreaming that the same troops 
with whom they had been asked to cooperate would soon be employed 
by the great apostle of liberation and humanity to slaughter them for 
no other reason than that they, the Filipinos, continued to stand up 
for their own freedom and independence. 

But just that was to happen. As soon as Manila was taken and 
we had no further use for our Filipino allies, they were ordered to fall 
back and back from the city and its suburbs. Our military com- 
manders treated the Filipinos' country as if it were our own. When 
Aguinaldo sent one of his aides-de-camp to General Merritt with a 
request for an interview. General Merritt was " too busy." When 
our peace negotiations with Spain began, and representatives of the 
Filipinos asked for audience to solicit consideration of the rights and 
wishes of their people, the doors were slammed in their faces, in 
Washington as well as in Paris. And behind those doors the scheme 
was hatched to deprive the Philippine Islanders of independence 
from foreign rule, and to make them the subjects of another foreign 
ruler ; and that foreign ruler their late ally, this great republic which 
had grandly proclaimed to the world that its war against Spain was 
not a war of conquest, but a war of liberation and humanity. 

Behind those doors which were tightly closed to the people of the 
Philippines, a treaty was made with Spain by the direction of President 
McKinley, which provided for the cession of the Philippine Islands 
by Spain to the United States for a consideration of $ 20,000,000. 
It has been said that this sum was not purchase-money, but a 
compensation for improvements made by Spain, or a solatium to 
sweeten the pill of cession, or what not. But, stripped of all cloudy 
verbiage, it was really purchase-money, the sale being made by Spain 
under duress. Thus Spain sold, and the United States bought, what 
was called the sovereignty of Spain over the Philippine Islands and 
their people. 

Now look at the circumstances under which that " cession " was 
made. Spain had lost the possession of the country, except a few 
isolated and helpless little garrisons, most of which were effectively 
blockaded by the Filipinos. The American forces occupied Cavite 
and the harbor and city of Manila, and nothing more. The bulk of 
the country was occupied and possessed by the people thereof, over 
whom Spain had, in point of fact, ceased to exercise any sovereignty, 
the Spanish power having been driven out or destroyed by the 
Filipino insurrection, while the United States had not acquired, 
beyond Cavite and Manila, any authority of whatever name by 
military occupation, nor by recognition on the part of the people. 
Aguinaldo's army surrounded Manila on the land side, and his 
government claimed organized control over fifteen provinces. That 
government was established at Malolos, not far from Manila ; and a 
very respectable government it was. According to Mr. Barrett, our 
late Minister in Siam, hinaself an ardent imperialist, who had seen it, 

7 



it had a well-organized executive, divided into several departments, 
ably conducted, and a popular Assembly, a Congress, which would 
favorably compare with the Parliament of Japan — an infinitely better 
government than the insurrectionary government of Cuba ever was. 

It is said that Aguinaldo's government was in operation among 
only a part of the people of the islands. This is true. But it is also 
certain that it was recognized and supported by an immeasurably 
larger part of the people than Spanish sovereignty, which had practi- 
cally ceased to exist, and than American rule, which was confined to 
a harbor and a city, and which was carried on by the exercise of 
military force under what was substantially martial law over a people 
that constituted about one-twentieth of the whole population of the 
islands. Thus, having brought but a very small fraction of the 
country and its people under our military control, we bought by that 
treaty the sovereignty over the whole from a Power which had prac- 
tically lost that sovereignty, and therefore did no longer possess it ; 
and we contemptuously disdained to consult the existing native 
government, which actually did control a large part of the country 
and people, and which had been our ally in the war with Spain. 
The sovereignty we thus acquired may well be defined as Abraham 
Lincoln once defined the " popular sovereignty " of Senator Doug- 
las's doctrine — as being like a soup made by boiling the shadow of 
the breastbone of a pigeon that had been starved to death. 

No wonder that treaty found opposition in the senate. Virulent 
abuse was heaped upon the " statesman who would oppose the ratifi- 
cation of a peace treaty." A peace treaty? This was no peace 
treaty at all. It was a treaty with half-a-dozen bloody wars in its 
belly. It was, in the first place, an open and brutal declaration of 
war against our allies, the Filipinos, who struggled for freedom and 
independence from foreign rule. Every man not totally blind could 
see that. For such a treaty the true friends of peace could, of course, 
not vote. 

But more. Even before that treaty had been assented to by the 
Senate, that is, even befoie that ghastly shadow of our Philippine 
sovereignty had obtained any legal sanction, President McKinley 
assumed of his own motion the sovereignty of the Philippine Islands 
by his famous "benevolent assimilation" order of December 21, 
1898, through which our military commander at Manila was directed 
forthwith to extend the military government of the United States over 
the whole archipelago, and by which the Filipinos were notified that, 
if they refused to submit, they would be compelled by force of arms. 
Having bravely fought for their freedom and independence from one 
foreign rule, they did refuse to submit to another foreign rule, and 
then the slaughter of our late allies began — the slaughter by American 
arms of a once friendly and confiding people. And this slaughter 
has been going on ever since. 

This is a grim story. Two years ago the prediction of such a 
possibility would have been regarded as a hideous nightmare, as the 
offspring of a diseased imagination. But today it is a true tale — a 

8 



plain recital of facts taken from the official records. These things 
have actually been done in these last two years by and under the 
administration of William McKinley. This is our Philippine war as 
it stands. Is it a wonder that the American people should be 
troubled in their consciences ? But let us not be too swift in our 
judgment on the conduct of those in power over us. Let us hear 
what they have to say in defense of it. 

It is pretended that we had a right to the possession of the 
Philippines, and that self-respect demanded us to enforce that right. 
What kind of right was it? The right of conquest? Had we really 
acquired that country by armed conquest, which, as President 
McKinley has told us, is, according to the American code of morals, 
"criminal aggression"? But if we had thrown aside our code of 
morals, we had then not conquered more than the bay and city of 
Manila. The rest of the country was controlled, if by anybody, by 
the Filipinos. Or was it the right of possession by treaty ? I have 
already shown that the President ordered the enforcement of our 
sovereignty over the archipelago before the treaty had by ratifi- 
cation gained legal effect, and also that, in making that treaty, we had 
bought something called sovereignty which Spain had ceased to 
possess and could therefore not sell and deliver. But let me bring 
the matter home to you by a familiar example. 

Imagine that in our revolutionary times, France, being at war 
with England, had brought to this country a fleet and an army, and 
had, without any definite compact to that effect, cooperated as an ally 
with our revolutionary forces, permitting all the while the Americans 
to believe that she did this without any mercenary motive, and that, in 
case of victory, the American colonies would be free and independ- 
ent. Imagine then that, after the British surrendered at Yorktown, 
the King of France had extorted from the British King a treaty 
ceding, for a consideration of $ 20,000,000, the sovereignty over the 
American colonies to France, and that thereupon the King of France 
had coolly notified the Continental Congress and General Washington 
that they had to give up their idea of national independence, and to 
surrender unconditionally to the sovereignty of France, wherefor the 
French King promised them " benevolent assimilation." Imagine, 
further, that upon the protest of the Americans that Great Britain, 
having lost everything in the colonies except New York city and a 
few other little posts, had no sovereignty to cede, the French King 
answered that he had bought the Americans at $5 a head, and that if 
they refused to submit he would give them benevolent assimilation in 
the shape of bullets. Can there be any doubt that the Continental 
Congress and General Washington would have retorted that, no matter 
what the French King might have bought. Great Britain had no sov- 
ereignty left to sell; that least of all would the Americans permit 
themselves to be sold ; that the French, in so treating their American 
allies after such high-sounding professions of friendship and gen- 
erosity, were a lot of mean, treacherous, contemptible hypocrites, and 
that the Americans would rather die than submit to such wolves in 



sheep's clothing. And will any patriotic American now deny that, what- 
ever quibbles of international law about possible cessions of a lost 
sovereignty might be invented, such conduct of the French would 
have been simply a shame and that the Americans of that time would 
have eternally disgraced themselves if they had failed to resist unto 
death? How, then, can the same patriotic American demand that 
the Filipinos should surrender and accept American sovereignty 
under circumstances exactly parallel ? And that parallel will not be 
shaken by any learned international law technicalities, which do not 
touch the moral element of the subject. 

It is also pretended that, whatever our rights, the Filipinos were 
the original aggressors in the pending fight, and that our troops found 
themselves compelled to defend their flag against assault. What are 
the facts ? One evening early in February last some Filipino soldiers 
entered the American lines without, however, attacking anybody. An 
American sentry fired, killing one of the Filipinos. Then a desultory 
firing began at the outposts. It spread until it assumed the propor- 
tions of an extensive engagement, in which a large number of 
Filipinos were killed. It is a well-established fact that this engage- 
ment could not have been a premeditated affair on the part of the 
Filipinos, as many of their officers, including Aguinaldo's private 
secretary, were at the time in the theatres and cafes of Manila. It is 
further well known that the next day Aguinaldo sent an officer, General 
Torres, under a flag of truce to General Otis to declare that the fighting 
had not been authorized by Aguinaldo, but had begun accidentally ; 
that Aguinaldo wished to have it stopped, and proposed to that end the 
establishment of a neutral zone between the two armies, such as 
might be agreeable to General Otis ; whereupon General Otis curtly 
answered that the fighting, having once begun, must go on to the grim 
end. Who was it that really wanted the fight ? 

But far more important than all this is the fact that President 
McKinley's " benevolent assimilation " order, which even before the 
ratification. of the treaty demanded that the Philippine Islanders 
should unconditionally surrender to American sovereignty, in default 
whereof our military forces would compel them, was really the Presi- 
dent's declaration of war against the Filipinos insisting upon inde- 
pendence, however you may quibble about it. When an armed man 
enters my house under some questionable pretext, and tells me that I 
must yield to him unconditional control of the premises or he will 
knock me down — who is the aggressor, no matter who strikes the 
first blow ? No case of aggression can be clearer, shuffle and prevari- 
cate as you will. 

Let us recapitulate. We go to war with Spain in behalf of an 
oppressed colony of hers. We solemnly proclaim this to be a war — 
not of conquest — God forbid ! — but of liberation and humanity. We 
invade the Spanish colony of the Philippines, destroy the Spanish fleet, 
and invite the cooperation of the Filipino insurgents against Spain. 
We accept their eff'ective aid as allies, all the while permitting them to 
believe that, in case of victory, they will be free and independent. 

10 



By active fighting they get control of a large part of the interior 
country, from which Spain is virtually ousted. When we have cap- 
tured Manila and have no further use for our Filipino allies, our 
President directs that, behind their backs, a treaty be made with 
Spain transferring their country to us ; and even before that treaty is 
ratified, he tells them that, in place of the Spaniards, they must accept 
us as their masters, and that if they do not, they will be compelled by 
force of arms. They refuse, and we shoot them down ; and, as 
President 3IcKinley said at Pittsburgh, we shall continue to shoot 
them down " without useless parley." 

I have recited these things in studiously sober and dry matter-of- 
fact language, without oratorical ornament or appeal. I ask you now 
what epithet can you find justly to characterize such a course? 
Happily, you need not search for one, for President McKinley him- 
self has furnished the best when, in a virtuous moment, he said 
that annexation by force should not be thought of, for, according to 
the American code of morals, it would be " criminal aggression." 
Yes, " criminal " is the word. Have you ever heard of any aggression 
more clearly criminal than this ? And in this case there is an element 
of peculiarly repulsive meanness and treachery. I pity the American 
who can behold this spectacle without the profoundest shame, con- 
trition, and resentment. Is it a wonder, I repeat, that the American 
people, in whose name this has been done, should be troubled in 
their consciences ? 

To justify, or rather to excuse such things nothing but a plea of 
the extremest necessity will avail. Did such a necessity exist ? In a 
sort of helpless way the defenders of this policy ask: "What else 
could the President have done under the circumstances"? This 
question is simply childish. If he thought he could not order Com- 
modore Dewey away from Manila after the execution of the order to 
destroy the Spanish fleet, he could have told the people of the Phil- 
ippine Islands that this was, on our part, a war, not of conquest, but 
of liberation and humanity; that we sympathized with their desire for 
freedom and independence, and that we would treat them as we had 
specifically promised to treat the Cuban people in furthering the estab- 
lishment of an independent government. And this task would have 
been much easier than in the case of Cuba, since, according to 
Admiral Dewey's repeatedly emphatic testimony, the Filipinos were 
much better fitted for such a government. 

Our ingenious Postmaster-General has told us that the President 
could not have done that because he had no warrant for it, since he 
did not know whether the American people would wish to keep the 
Philippine Islands. But what warrant, then, had the President for 
putting before the Filipinos by his "benevolent assimilation order," 
the alternative of submission to our sovereignty or war? Had he any 
assurance that the American people willed that? If such was his 
dream, there may be a rude awakening in store for him. But I say 
that for assenting to the aspiration of the Filipinos to freedom and 
independence he would have had the fullest possible warrant in the 

11 



spirit of our institutions and in the resolution of Congress stamping 
our war against Spain as a war of liberation and humanity. And 
such a course would surely have been approved by the American people, 
except perhaps some Jingoes bent upon wild adventure, and some 
syndicates of speculators unscrupulous in their greed of gain. 

There are also some who, with the mysterious mien of a superior 
sense of responsibility, tell us that the President could not have acted 
otherwise, because Dewey's victory devolved upon us some grave 
international or other obligations which would have been disregarded 
had the President failed to claim sovereignty over the Philippines. 
What ? Did not the destruction of Cervera's fleet, and the taking 
of Santiago devolve the same obligations upon us with regard to 
Cuba? And who has ever asserted that therefore Cuba must be put 
under our sovereignty? And, did ever anybody pretend that our 
victories in Mexico fifty years ago imposed upon us international or 
other obligations which compelled us to assume sovereignty over the 
Mexican Republic after we had conquered it much more than we have 
conquered the Philippines Does not, in the light of history, this 
obligation-dodge appear as a hollow mockery ? 

An equally helpless plea is it, that the President could not treat 
with Aguinaldo and his followers because they did not represent the 
whole population of the islands. But having an established govern- 
ment and an army of some 25,000 or 30,000 men, and in that army 
men from various tribes, they represented at least something. They 
represented at least a large part of the population and a strong 
nucleus of a national organization. And, as we have to confess that in 
the Philippines there is no active opposition to the Filipino govern- 
ment except that which we ourselves manage to excite, it may 
be assumed that they represent the sympathy of practically the 
whole people. 

But, pray, what do we represent there? At first, while the 
islanders confided in us as their liberators, we represented their hope 
for freedom and independence. Since we have betrayed that hope 
and have begun to slaughter them, we represent, as a brute force 
bent upon subjugating them, only their bitter hatred and detestation. 
We have managed to turn virtually that whole people who at first 
greeted us with childlike trust as their beloved deliverers, into deadly 
enemies. For it is a notorious fact that those we regard as "amigos" 
to-day will to-morrow stand in the ranks of our foes. We have not a 
true friend left among the islanders, unless it be some speculators, and 
the Sultan of Sulu with his harem and his slaves, whose support we 
have bought with a stipend like that which the republic in its feeble 
infancy paid to the pirates of the Barbary States. And even his 
friendship will hardly last long. Yes, it is a terrible fact that in one 
year we have made them hate us more, perhaps, than they hated even 
their Spanish oppressors who were at least less foreign to them, and 
that the manner in which we are treating them has caused many, if 
not most of the Filipinos, to wish that they had patiently suffered 
Spanish tyranny rather than be "liberated" by us. 

12 



Thus, it appears that we who represent in the Phihppines no 
popular element at all, but are unpopular in the extreme, cannot enter 
into relations with an established government for the pretended 
reason that it does not represent all the people, while it does represent 
a very important part of them, and would probably soon represent 
them all if we did not constantly throw obstacles in its way — aye, if 
we did not seek to extinguish it in blood. Was there ever a false 
pretense more glaring? 

But the ghastliest argument of all in defense of the President's 
course is that he had to extend American sovereignty over the whole 
archipelago even before the ratification of the treaty, and that he was, 
and is now, obliged to shoot down the Filipinos, to the end of "restor- 
ing order" and "preventing anarchy" in the islands. We are to 
understand that if our strong armed hand did not restrain them from 
doing as they pleased — that is if they were left free and independent 
— they would quickly begin to cut one another's or other people's 
throats, and to ravish and destroy one another's or other people's 
property. We may reasonably assume that if this were sure to be the 
upshot of their being left free and independent, they would have 
shown some such tendency where they have actually held sway under 
their own revolutionary government. 

Now for the facts. We have the reports of two naval officers 
and of two members of the Signal Corps who traveled extensively 
behind Aguinaldo's lines through the country controlled by his gov- 
ernment. And what did they find? Quiet and orderly rural or 
municipal communities, in all appearance well organized and governed, 
full of enthusiasm for their hberty and independence, which they 
thought secured by the expulsion of the Spaniards, and for their 
leader Aguinaldo, and at the time — it was before President McKinley 
had ordered the subjugation of the islands — also for the Americans, 
whom, with childlike confidence, they still believed friendly to their 
freedom from all foreign rule. We maybe sure that if any anarchical 
disturbances had happened among them, our imperialists would have 
eagerly made report. But there has been nothing at all equivalent to 
such things of our own as the famous " battle of Virden " in Illinois, 
or the race troubles in our own states, or the nunerous lynchings we 
have witnessed with shame and alarm in various parts of our republic. 
The only rumors of so-called " anarchy " have come through a British 
consul on the island of Borneo, who writes that bloody broils are 
occurring in some of the southernmost regions of the Philippine archi- 
pelago, and that the Americans are wanted there. But the Americans 
are engaged in killing orderly Filipinos — Filipino soldiers of just 
that Filipino government which, on its part, would probably soon 
restore order in the troubled places, if it had not to defend itself 
against the "criminal aggression" of the Americans. 

The imperialists wish us to believe that in the Philippines there 
is bloody disorder wherever our troops are not. In fact, after the 
Filipinos had expelled the Spaniards from the interior of their country, 
bloody disorders began there only when our troops appeared. Here is 

13 



an example. In December last the city of Iloilo, the second city in 
commercial importance in the Philippines, was evacuated by the 
Spaniards and occupied by the Filipinos. Gen. M. P. Miller of our 
army was sent in command of an expedition to take possession of it. 
As he has publicly stated, when he appeared with his ships and 
soldiers before the city, he "received a letter from the business people 
of Iloilo, principally foreigners, stating that good order was being 
maintained, life and property being protected, and requesting him not 
to attack at present." But soon afterwards he received peremptory 
orders to attack, and did so ; and then the killing and the burning of 
houses and other work of devastation began. Can it be said that our 
troops had to go there to "restore order" and prevent bloodshed 
and devastation ? No, order artd safety existed there, and it was only 
with our troops that the bloodshed and devastation came which other- 
wise might not have occurred. 

I am far from meaning to picture the Philippine Islanders as 
paragons of virtue and gende conduct. But I challenge the Imperial- 
ists to show me any instances of bloody disturbance or other savagery 
among them sufficient to create any necessity for our armed 
interference to "restore order" or to "save them from anarchy." I 
ask, and demand an answer: Is it not true that, even if there has 
been such a disorderly tendency, it would have required a long time 
for it to kill one-tenth as many human beings as we have killed and 
to cause one-tenth as much devastation as we have caused by our 
assaults upon them? Is it not true that, instead of being obliged to 
"restore order," we have carried riot and death and desolation into 
peaceful communities whose only offense was not that they did not 
maintain order and safety among themselves, but that they refused to 
accept us as their rulers? And here is the rub. 

In the vocabulary of our imperialists "order" means, above all, 
submission to their will. Any other kind of order, be it ever so 
peaceful and safe, must be suppressed with a bloody hand. This 
" order " is the kind that has been demanded by the despot since the 
world had a history. Its language has already become dangerously 
familiar to us — a familiarity which cannot cease too soon. 

From all these points of view, therefore, the Philippine war was 
as unnecessary as it is unjust. A wanton, wicked, and abominable 
war — so it is called by untold thousands of American citizens, and 
so it is at heart felt to be, I have no doubt, by an immense majority of 
the American people. Aye, as such it is cursed by many of our very 
soldiers whom our government orders to shoot down innocent peo- 
ple. And who will deny that this war would certainly have been 
avoided had the President remained true to the national pledge that 
the war against Spain should be a war of liberation and humanity and 
not of conquest ? Can there be any doubt that, if the assurance 
had honestly been given and carried out, we might have had, for the 
mere asking, all the coaling stations, and facilities for commercial and 
industrial enterprise, and freedom for the establishment of schools and 
churches we might reasonably desire? And what have we now ? After 

14 



eight months' slaughter and devastation, squandered treasure and 
shame, an indefinite prospect of more and more slaughter, devasta- 
tion, squandered treasure and shame. 

But we are asked, since we have to deal with a situation not as it 
might ha\e been, but as it is, what do we propose to do now ? We may 
fairly turn about and say, since not we, but you, have got the country 
into this frightful mess, what have you to propose ? Well, and what 
is the answer? "No useless parley! More soldiers! More guns! 
More blood! More devastation ! Kill, kill, kill! And when we have 
killed enough, so that further resistance stops, then we shall see." 
Translated from smooth phrase into plain English, this is the pro- 
gramme. Let us examine it with candor and coolness. 

What is the ultimate purpose of this policy ? To be perfectly 
fair, I will assume that the true spirit of American imperialism is rep- 
resented not by the extremists who want to subjugate the Philippine 
Islanders at any cost and then exploit the islands to the best advan- 
tage of the conquerors, but by the more humane persons who say that 
we must establish our sovereignty over them to make them happy, to 
prepare them for self-government, and even recognize their right to 
complete independence as soon as they show themselves fit for it. 

Let me ask these well-meaning citizens a simple question. If you 
think that the American people may ultimately consent to the indepen- 
dence oE those islanders as a matter of right and good policy, why do you 
insist upon killing them now ? You answer : Because they refuse to 
recognize our sovereignty. Why do they so refuse ? Because they think 
themselves entitled to independence, and are willing to fight and die 
for it. But if you insist upon continuing to shoot them down for this 
reason, does not that mean that you want to kill them for demanding 
the identical thing which you yourself think that you may ultimately 
find it just and proper to grant them? Would not every drop of blood 
shed in such a guilty sport cry to heaven ? For you must not forget 
that establishing our sovereignty in the Philippines means the going 
on with the work of slaughter and devastation to the grim end, and 
nobody can tell where that end will be. To kill men in a just war 
and in obedience to imperative necessity is one thing. To kill men 
for demanding what you yourself may ultimately have to approve, 
is another. How can such killing adopted as a policy be countenanced 
by a man of conscience and humane feelings? And yet, such killing 
without useless parley is the policy proposed to us. 

We are told that we must trust President McKinley and his 
advisers to bring us out " all right." I should be glad to be able to do 
so ; but I cannot forget that they have got us in all wrong. And here 
we have to consider a point of immense importance, which I solemnly 
urge upon the attention of the American people. 

It is one of the fundamental principles of our system of demo- 
cratic government that only the Congress has the power to declare 
war. VVhat does this signify? That a declaration of war, the 
initiation of an armed conflict between this nation and some other 
Power — the most solemn and responsible act a nation can perform, 

15 



involving as it does the lives and fortunes of an uncounted number of 
human beings — shall not be at the discretion of the Executive branch 
of the government, but shall depend upon the authority of the legis- 
lative representatives of the people — in other words, that, as much as 
the machinery of government may make such a thing possible, the 
deliberate will of the people constitutionally expressed shall determine 
the awful question of peace or war. 

It is true there may be circumstances of foreign aggression or 
similar emergencies to precipitate an armed conflict without there 
being a possibility of consulting the popular will beforehand. But, 
such exceptional cases notwithstanding, the constitutional principle 
remains that the question of peace or war is essentially one which the 
popular will is to decide, and that no possibility should be lost to 
secure upon it the expression of the popular will through its legisla- 
tive organs. Whenever such a possibility is willfully withheld or neg- 
lected, and a war has been brought upon the country without every 
available means being employed thus to consult the popular will upon 
that question, the spirit of the constitution is^flagrantly violated in 
one of its most essential principles. 

We are now engaged in a war with the Filipinos. You may 
quibble about it as you will, call it by whatever name you will — it ?xa 
war; and a war of conquest on our part at that — a war of bare-faced, 
cynical conquest. Now, I ask any fair-minded man whether the Pres- 
ident, before beginning that war, or while carrying it on, has ever 
taken any proper steps to get from the Congress, the representatives 
of the people, any proper authority for making that war. He issued 
his famous " benevolent assimilation " order, directing the army to 
bring the whole Philippine archipelago as promptly as possible under 
the military government of the United States, on December 21, 1898, 
while Congress was in session, and before the treaty with Spain, trans- 
ferring her shadowy sovereignty over the islands, had acquired any 
force of law by the assent of the Senate. That was substantially a 
declaration of war against the Filipinos asserting their independence. 
He took this step of his own motion. To be sure, he has constantly 
been telling us that "the whole subject is with Congress," and that 
" Congress shall direct." But when did he, while Congress was in 
session, lay a full statement before that body and ask its direction ? 
Why did he not, before he proclaimed that the slaughter must go on 
without useless parley, call Congress together to consult the popular 
will in constitutional form ? Why, even in these days, while "swinging 
around the circle," the President and his secretaries are speaking of 
the principal thing, the permanent annexation of the Philippines, not 
as a question still to be determined, but as a thing done — concluded by 
the executive, implying that Congress will have simply to regulate the 
details. 

Now you may bring ever so many arguments to show that the 
President had tccluiiuilly a right to act as he did, and your reasoning 
may be ever so plausible — yet the great fact remains that the Presi- 
dent did not seek and obtain authority from Congress as to the war to 

16 



be made, and the policy to be pursued, and that he acted upon his own 
motion. And this autocratic conduct is vastly aggravated by the 
other fact that in this democratic republic, the government of which 
should be that of an intelligent and well-informed public opinon, a 
censorship of news has been instituted, which is purposely and sys- 
tematically seeking to keep the American people in ignorance of the 
true state of things at the seat of war, and by all sorts of deceit- 
ful tricks to deprive them of the knowledge required for the formation 
of a correct judgment. And this censorship was practiced not only 
in Manila, but directly by the administration in Washington. Here 
is a specimen performance revealed by a member of Congress in a 
public speech; the War Department gave out a dispatch from Manila, 
as follows: " Volunteers willing to remain." The Congressman went to 
the War Department and asked for the original, which read : " Volun- 
teers unwilling to reenlist, but willing to remain until transports arrive." 
You will admit that such distortion of official news is a downright 
swindle upon the people. Does not this give strong color to the 
charge of the war correspondents that the news is systematically and 
confessedly so doctored by the officials that it may " help the admin- 
istration ? " 

Those are, therefore, by no means wrong who call this "the 
President's War." And a war so brought about and so conducted 
the American people are asked to approve and encourage, simply 
because "we are in it" — that is, because the President of his own 
motion has got us into it. Have you considered what this means? 

Every man of public experience knows how powerful and seduc- 
tive precedent is as an argument in the interpretation of laws and 
of constitutional provisions, or in justification of governmental prac- 
tices. When a thing, no matter how questionable, has once been 
done by the government, and approved, or even acquiesced in, by the 
people, that act will surely be used as a justification of its being done 
again. In nothing is the authority of precedent more dangerous than 
in defending usurpations of governmental power. And it is remark- 
able how prone the public mind is, especially under the influence of 
party spirit, to accept precedent as a warrant for such usurpations, 
which, judged upon their own merits, would be sternly condemned. 
And every such precedent is apt to bring forth a worse one. It is in 
this way that the most indispensable bulwarks of free government, 
and of public peace and security may be undermined. To meet such 
dangers the American people should, if ever, remember the old saying 
that "eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. ' 

I am not here as a partisan, but as an American citizen anxious 
for the future of the republic. And I cannot too earnestly admonish 
the American people, if they value the fundamental principles of their 
government, and their own security and that of their children, for a 
moment to throw aside all partisan bias and soberly to consider what 
kind of a precedent they would set, if they consented to, and by con- 
senting approved, the President's management of the Philippine busi- 
ness merely "because we are in it." We cannot expect all our future 

17 



Presidents to be models of public virtue and wisdom, as George 
Washington was. Imagine now in the Presidential office a man well- 
meaning, but, it may be, short-sighted and pliable, and under the influ- 
ence of so-called "friends" who are greedy and reckless speculators, 
and who would not scruple to push him into warlike complications in 
order to get great opportunities for profit ; or a man of that inordinate 
ambition which intoxicates the mind and befogs the conscience ; or a 
man of extreme partisan spirit, who honestly believes the victory 
of his party to be necessary for the salvation of the universe, and 
may think that a foreign broil would serve the chances of his party ; 
or a man of an uncontrollable combativeness of temperament which 
might run away with his sense of responsibility — and that we shall 
have such men in the presidential chair is by no means unlikely with 
our loose way of selecting candidates for the presidency. Imagine, 
then, a future President belonging to either of these classes to have 
before him the precedent of Mr. McKinley's management of the Phil- 
ippine business, sanctioned by the approval or only the acquiescence 
of the people, and to feel himself permitted — nay, even encouraged — 
to say to himself that, as this precedent shows, he may plunge the 
country into warlike conflicts of his own motion, without asking leave of 
Congress, with only some legal technicalities to cover his usurpation, 
or, even without such, and that he may, by a machinery of deception 
called a war-censorship, keep the people in the dark about what is 
going on ; and that into however bad a mess he may have got the 
country, he may count upon the people, as soon as a drop of blood 
has been shed, to uphold the usurpation and to cry down everybody 
who opposes it as a "traitor," and all this because "we are in it" ! 
Can you conceive a more baneful precedent, a more prolific source 
of danger to the peace and security of the country? Can any sane 
man deny that it will be all the more prolific of evil if in this way 
we drift into a foreign policy full of temptation for dangerous adventure ? 

I say, therefore, that, if we have the future of the republic at 
heart, we must not only not uphold the administration in its course, 
because "we are in it," but just because we are in it, have been got into 
it in such a way, the American people should stamp the adminis- 
tration's proceedings with a verdict of disapproval so clear and 
emphatic, and "get out of it" in such a fashion, that this will be a sol- 
emn warning to future Presidents instead of a seductive precedent. 

What, then, to accomplish this end is to be done ? Of course, 
we, as we are here, can only advise. But by calling forth expressions 
of the popular will by various means of public demonstration, and, if 
need be, at the polls, we can make that advice so strong that those in 
power will hardly disregard it. We have often been taunted with hav- 
ing no positive policy to propose. But such a policy has more than 
once been proposed and I can only repeat it. 

In the first place, let it be well understood that those are egre- 
giously mistaken who think that if by a strong military effort the Phil- 
ippine war be stopped, everything will be right and no more question 
about it. No, the American trouble of conscience will not be appeased, 

18 



and the question will be as big and virulent as ever, unless the close 
of the war be promptly followed by an assurance to the islanders of 
their freedom and independence, which assurance, if given now, 
would surely end the war without more fighting. 

We propose, therefore, that it be given now. Let there be at once 
an armistice between our forces and the Filipinos. Let the Philippine 
Islanders at the same time be told that the American people will be 
glad to see them establish an independent government, and to aid them 
in that task as far as may be necessary; that, if the different tribes 
composing the population of the Philippines are disposed, as at least 
most of them, if not all, are likely to be, to attach themselves in some 
way to the government already existing under the presidency of Agui- 
naldo, we shall cheerfully accept that solution of the question, and 
even, if required, lend our good offices to bring it about; and that 
meanwhile we shall deem it our duty to protect them against interfer- 
ence from other foreign Powers — in other words, that with regard to 
them we mean honestly to live up to the righteous principles with the 
profession of which we commended to the world our Spanish war. 

And then let us have in the Philippines, to carry out this pro- 
gramme, not a small politician, nor a meddlesome martinet, but a 
statesman of large mind and genuine sympathy, who will not merely 
deal in sanctimonious cant and oily promises with a string to them, 
but who will prove by his acts that he and we are honest ; who will keep 
in mind that their government is not merely to suit us, but to suit 
them; that it should not be measured by standards which we ourselves 
have not been able to reach, but be a government of their own, adapted 
to their own conditions and notions — whether it be a true republic, like 
ours, or better, or a dictatorship like that of Porlirio Diaz, in Mexico, 
or an oligarchy like the one maintained by us in Hawaii, or even 
something like the boss rule we are tolerating in New York and Penn- 
sylvania. 

Those who talk so much about " fitting a people for self-govern- 
ment" often forget that no people were ever made " fit " for self-gov- \ 
ernment by being kept in the leading-strings of a foreign Power. You 
learn to walk by doing your own crawling and stumbling. Self-gov- 
ernment is learned only by exercising it upon one's own responsi- ^ 
bility. Of course there will be mistakes, and troubles and disorders. 
We have had and now have these, too — at the beginning our persecu- 
tion of the Tories, our flounderings before the constitution was formed, 
our Shay's rebellion, our whiskey war, and various failures and dis- 
turbances — among them a civil war that cost us a loss of life and 
treasure horrible to think of, and the murder of two Presidents. But 
who will say that on account of these things some foreign Power should 
have kept the American people in leading-strings to teach them to 
govern themselves ? If the Philippine Islanders do as well as the 
Mexicans, who have worked their way, since we let them alone after 
our war of 1847, through many disorders, to an orderly government, 
who will have a right to find fault with the result ? Those who seek 
to impose upon them an unreasonable standard of excellence in 

19 



self-government, do not seriously wish to let them govern themselves at 
all. You may take it as a general rule that he who wants to reign 
over others is solemnly convinced that they are quite unable to 
govern themselves. 

Now, what objection is there to the policy dictated by our funda- 
mental principles and our good faith ? I hear the angry cry: " What ? 
Surrender to Aguinaldo ? Will not the world ridicule and despise us 
for such a confession of our incompetency to deal with so feeble a foe ? 
What will become of our prestige ? " No, we shall not surrender to 
Aguinaldo. In giving up a criminal aggression, we shall surrender 
only to our own consciences, to our own sense of right and justice, 
to our own understanding of our own true interests, and to the vital 
principles of our own republic. Nobody will laugh at us whose good 
opinion we have reason to cherish. There will, of course, be an out- 
cry of disappointment in England. But from whom will it come ? 
From such men as James Bryce or John Morley or any one of those 
true friends of this republic who understand and admire and wish to 
perpetuate and spread the fundamental principles of its vitality ? No, 
not from them. But the outcry will come from those in England who 
long to see us entangled in complications apt to make this American 
republic dependent upon British aid and thus subservient to British 
interests. They, indeed, will be quite angry. But the less we mind 
their displeasure as well as their flattery, the better for the safety as 
well as the honor of our country. 

The true friends of this republic in England, and, indeed, all over 
the world, who are now grieving to see us go astray, will rejoice, and 
their hearts will be uplifted with new confidence in our honesty, in our 
wisdom, and in the virtue of democratic institutions when they behold 
the American people throwing aside all the puerilities of false pride, 
and returning to the path of their true duty. The world knows how 
strong we are. It knows full well that if the American people chose 
to put forth their strength, they could quickly overcome a foe infinitely 
more powerful than the Filipinos, and that, if we, possessing the 
strength of the giant, do not use the giant's strength against this fee- 
ble foe, it is from the noblest of motives — our love of liberty, our 
sense of justice and our respect for the rights of others — the respect 
of the strong for the rights of the weak. The moral prestige which, 
in fact, we have lost, will be restored, while our prestige of physical 
prowess and power will certainly not be lessened by showing that we 
have not only soldiers, guns, ships and money, but also a conscience. 

Therefore, the cry is childish, that, unless we take and keep the 
Philippines, some other Power will promptly grab them. Many a time 
this cry has been raised to stampede the American people into a policy 
of annexation — in the San Domingo case, twenty-eight years ago, and 
more recently in the case of Hawaii — and in neither case was there the 
slightest danger — not that there were no foreign Powers that would 
have liked to have those islands, but because they could not have taken 
them without the risk of grave consequences. Now the old bugbear 
must do service again. Why should not American diplomacy set 

20 



about to secure the consent of the Powers most nearly concerned to 
an agreement to make the Philippine Islands neutral territory, as Bel- 
gium and Switzerland are in Europe ? Because some of those Powers 
would like to have the Philippines themselves ? Well, are there not 
among the European Powers some that would like to have Belgium or 
Switzerland ? Certainly; and just because there are several watching 
each other, the neutrality of those two countries is guaranteed. But 
even if such an agreement could not be obtained, we maybe sure that 
there is no foreign Power that would lightly risk a serious quarrel with 
the United States, if this republic, for the protection of the Philippine 
Islanders in their effort to build up an independent government, said 
to the world: " Hands off ! " So much for those who think that some- 
body else might be wicked enough to grab the Philippine Islands, and 
that, therefore, we must be wicked enough to do the grabbing our- 
selves. 

There are some American citizens who take of this question a 
purely commercial view. I declare I am ardently in favor of the 
greatest possible expansion of our trade, and I am happy to say that, 
according to official statistics, our foreign commerce, in spite of all 
hindrances raised against it, is now expanding tremendously, owing 
to the simple rule that the nation offering the best goods at propor- 
tionately the lowest prices will have the -markets. It will have them 
without armies, without war fleets, without bloody conquests, without 
colonies. I confess I am not in sympathy with those, if there be such 
men among us, who would sacrifice our national honor and the high 
ideals of the republic, and who would inflict upon our people the bur- 
dens and the demoralizing influences of militarism for a mere matter 
of dollars and cents. They are among the most dangerous enemies 
of the public welfare. But as to the annexation of the Philippines, I 
will, for argument's sake, adopt even their point of view for a moment 
and ask : Will it pay ? 

Now, it may \Vell be that the annexation of the Philippines 
would pay a speculative syndicate of wealthy capitalists, without at 
the same time paying the American people at large. As to peo- 
ple of our race, tropical countries like the Philippines may be fields 
of profit for rich men who can hire others to work for them, but 
not for those who have to work for themselves. Taking a 
general view of the Philippines as a commercial market for us, 
I need not again argue against the barbarous notion that in order 
to have a profitable trade with a country we must own it. If that 
were true, we should never have had any foreign commerce at all. 
Neither need I prove that it is very bad policy, when you wish to 
build up a profitable trade, to ruin your customer first, as you would 
ruin the Philippines by a protracted war. It is equally needless to 
show to any well-informed person that the profits of the trade with the 
islands themselves can never amount to the cost of making and main- 
taining the conquest of the Philippines. 

But there is another point of real importance. Many imperialists 
admit that our trade with the Philippines themselves will not nearly 

21 



be worth its cost ; but they say that we must have the PhiUppines as 
a foothold, a sort of power station, for the expansion of our trade on 
the Asiatic continent, especially in China. Admitting this, for argu- 
ment's sake, I ask what kind of a foothold we should really need. 
Coaling stations and docks for our fleet, and facilities for the estab- 
lishment of commercial houses and depots. That is all. And now 
I ask further, whether we could not easily have had these things if 
we had, instead of making war upon the Filipinos, favored the inde- 
pendence of the islands. Everybody knows that we could. We 
might have those things now for the mere asking, if we stopped the 
war and came to a friendly understanding with the Filipinos to- 
morrow. 

But now suppose we fight on and subjugate the Filipinos and 
annex the islands — what then ? We shall then have of coaling 
stations and commercial facilities no more than we would have had in 
the other case ; but the islanders will hate us as their bloody oppress- 
ors, and be our bitter and revengeful enemies for generations to come. 
You may say that this will be of no commercial importance. Let us 
see. It is by no means impossible, nor even improbable, that, if we 
are once in the way of extending our commerce with guns behind it, 
we may get into hot trouble with one or more of our competitors for 
that Asiatic trade. What then ? Then our enemies need only land 
some Filipino refugees whom we have driven out of their country, 
and some cargoes of guns and ammunition on the islands, and we 
shall soon — all the more if we depend on native troops — have a fire 
in our rear which will oblige us to fight the whole old fight over again. 
The present subjugation of the Philippines will, therefore, not only 
not be a help to the expansion of our Asiatic trade, but rather a con- 
stant danger and a clog to our feet. 

And here a word by the way. A year ago I predicted in an arti- 
cle published in the Century Magazi?ie, that if we turned our war of 
liberation into a war of conquest, our American sister republics south 
of us would become distrustful of our intentions with regard to them, 
and soon begin to form combinations against us, eventually even with 
European powers. The newspapers have of late been alive with 
vague rumors of that sort, so much so that a prominent journal of 
imperialistic tendency has found it necessary most earnestly to admon- 
ish the President in his next message, to give to the republics south of 
us the strongest possible assurances of our friendship and good faith. 
Suppose he does — who will believe him after we have turned our 
loudly heralded war of liberation into a land-grabbing game— a "crim- 
inal aggression ?" Nobody will have the slightest trust in our words, 
be they ever so fair. Drop your conquests, and no assurances of good 
faith will be required. Keep your conquests, and no such assurances 
will avail. Our southern neighbors, no less than the Filipinos, will 
then inevitably distrust our professions, fear our greed, and become 
our secret or open enemies. And who can be foolish enough 
to believe that this will strengthen our power and help our 
commerce? 

22 



It is useless to say that the subjugated Philippine Islanders will 
become our friends if we give them good government. However good 
that government may be, it will, to them, be foreign rule, and foreign 
rule especially hateful when begun by broken faith, cemented by 
streams of innocent blood and erected upon the ruins of devastated 
homes. The American will be and remain to them more a foreigner, 
an unsympathetic foreigner, than the Spaniard ever was. Let us 
indulge in no delusion about this. People of our race are but too 
much inclined to have little tenderness for the rights of what we regard 
as inferior races, especially those of darker skin. It is of ominous 
significance that to so many of our soldiers the Filipinos were only 
"niggers," and that they likened their fights against them to the 
"shooting of rabbits." And how much good government have we 
to give them ? Are you not aware that our first imperialistic adminis- 
tration is also the first that, since the enactment of the civil service 
law, has widened the gates again for a new foray of spoils politics in 
the public service ? What assurance have we that the Philippines, 
far away from public observation, will not be simply a pasture for 
needy politicians and for speculating syndicates to grow fat on, with- 
out much scruple as to the rights of the despised "natives?" Has it 
not been so with the British in India, although the British monarchy 
is much better fitted for imperial rule than our democratic republic 
can ever be ? True, in the course of time the government of India 
has been much improved ; but it required more than a century of 
slaughter, robbery, devastation, disastrous blundering, insurrection, 
and renewed bloody subjugation to evolve what there is of good gov- 
ernment in India now. And have the populations of India ever 
become the friends of England ? Does not England at heart tremble 
today lest some hostile foreign power come close enough to throw a 
firebrand into that fearful mass of explosives ? 

I ask you, therefore, in all soberness, leaving all higher consid- 
erations of justice, morality, and principle aside, whether, from a mere 
business point of view, the killing policy of subjugation is not a colossal, 
stupid blunder, and whether it would not have been, and would not 
now be, infinitely more sensible to win the confidence and cultivate 
the friendship of the islanders by recognizing them as of right enti- 
tled to their freedom and independence, as we have recognized the 
Cubans, and thus to obtain from their friendship and gratitude, for 
the mere asking, all the coaling stations and commercial facilities we 
require, instead of getting those things by fighting at an immense cost 
of blood and treasure, with a probability of having to fight for them 
again ? I put this question to every business man who is not a fool 
or a reckless speculator. Can there be any doubt of the answ^er ? 

A word now on a special point : There are some very estimable 
men among us who think that ev6n if we coi)cede to the islanders 
their independence, we should at least keep the city of Manila. I 
think differently, not from a mere impulse of generosity, but from an 
entirely practical point of view. Manila is the traditional, if not the 
natural, capital of the archipelago. To recognize the independence 

23 



of the Philippine Islanders, and at the same time to keep from them 
Manila, would mean as much as to recognize the independence of 
Cuba and to keep Havana. It would mean to withhold from the 
islanders their metropolis, that in which they naturally take the great- 
est pride, that which they legitimately most desire to have, and which, 
if withheld from them, they would most ardently wish to get back. 
The withholding of Manila would inevitably leave a sting in their 
hearts which would never cease to rankle, and might, under critical 
circumstances, give us as much trouble as the withholding of inde- 
pendence itself. If we wish them to be our friends, we should not 
do things by halves, but enable them to be our friends without reserve. 
And I maintain that, commercially as well as politically speaking, the 
true friendship of the Philippine Islanders will, as to our position in 
the East, be worth far more to us than the possession of Manila. 
We can certainly find other points which will give us similar commer- 
cial, as well as naval advantages without exciting any hostile feeling. 

Although I have by no means exhausted this vast subject, dis- 
cussing only a few phases of it, I have said enough, I think, to show 
that this policy of conquest is, from the point of view of public mor- 
als, in truth " criminal aggression " — made doubly criminal by the 
treacherous character of it ; and that from the point of view of mate- 
rial interest it is a blunder — a criminal blunder, and a blundering 
crime. I have addressed myself to your reason by sober argument, 
without any appeal to prejudice or passion. Might we not ask our 
opponents to answer these arguments, if they can, with equally sober 
reasoning, instead of merely assailing us with their wild cries of' 
"treason" and "lack of patriotism," and what not? Or do they 
really feel their cause to be so weak that they depend for its support 
on their assortment of inarticulate shouts and nebulous phrases ? 

Here are our " manifest destiny " men who tell us that whether 
it be right or not, we must take and keep the Philippines because 
" destiny " so wills it. We have heard this cry of manifest destiny 
before, especially when, a half century ago, the slave power demanded 
the annexation of Cuba and Central America to strengthen the slave 
power. The cry of destiny is most vociferously put forward by 
those who want to do a wicked thing and to shift the responsibility. 
The destiny of a free people lies in its intelligent will and its moral 
strength. When it pleads destiny, it pleads the baby act. Nay, 
worse ; the cry of destiny is apt to be the refuge of evil intent and of 
moral cowardice. 

Here are our " burden " men, who piously turn up their eyes and 
tell us with a melancholy sigh, that all this conquest business may be 
very irksome, but that a mysterious Providence has put it as a " bur- 
den " upon us, which, however sorrowfully, we must bear ; that this 
burden consists in our duty to take care of the poor people of the 
Philippines ; and that in order to take proper care of them we must 
exercise sovereignty over them ; and that if they refuse to accept our 
sovereignty, we must — alas 1 alas I — kill them, which makes the burden 
very solemn and sad. 

24 



But cheer up, brethren ! We may avoid that mournful way of 
taking care of them by killing them, if we simply recognize their right 
to take care of themselves, and gently aid them in doing so. Besides, 
you may be as much mistaken about the decrees of Providence as 
before our civil war the Southern Methodist bishops were who sol- 
emnly insisted that Providence willed the negroes to remain in 
slavery. 

Next there are our "flag " men, who insist that we must kill the 
Filipinos fighting for their independence to protect the honor of the 
stars and stripes. I agree that the honor of our flag sorely needs 
protection. We have to protect it against desecration by those who 
are making it an emblem of that hypocrisy which seeks to cover a 
war of conquest and subjugation with a cloak of humanity and reli- 
gion ; an emblem of that greed which would treat a matter involving 
our national honor, the integrity of our institutions, and the peace 
and character of the republic as a mere question of dollars and cents ; 
an emblem of that vulgar lust of war and conquest which recklessly 
tramples upon right and justice and all our higher ideals ; an emblem 
of the imperialistic ambitions which mock the noblest part of our 
history and stamp the greatest national heroes of our past as hypo- 
crites or fools. These are the dangers threatening the honor of our 
flag, against which it needs protection, and that protection we are 
striving to give it. 

Now, a last word to those of our fellow-citizens who feel and rec- 
ognize as we do that thp Philippine war of subjugation is wrong and 
cruel, and that we ought to recognize the independence of those peo- 
ple, but who insist that, having begun that war, we must continue it 
until the submission of the Filipinos is complete. I detest, but I can 
understand, the Jingo whose moral sense is obscured by intoxicating 
dreams of wild adventure and conquest, and to whom bloodshed and 
devastation have become a reckless sport. I detest even more, but 
still I can understand the cruel logic of those to whom everything is 
a matter of dollars and cents and whose greed of gain will walk 
coolly over slaughtered populations. But I must confess I cannot 
understand the reasoning of those who have moral sense enough to 
recognize that this war is criminal aggression — who must say to them- 
selves that every drop of blood shed in it by friend or foe is blood 
wantonly and wickedly shed, and that every act of devastation is bar- 
barous cruelty inflicted upon an innocent people — ^but who still 
maintain that we must go on killing, and devastating, and driving our 
brave soldiers into a fight which they themselves are cursing, because 
we have once begun it. This I cannot understand. Do they not con- 
sider that in such a war, which they themselves condemn as wanton 
and iniquitous, the more complete our success, the greater will be our 
disgrace ? 

What do they fear for the republic if, before having fully con- 
summated this criminal aggression, we stop to give a people strug- 
gling for their freedom what is due them ? Will this republic be less 
powerful ? It will be as strong as ever, nay, stronger, for it will have 

26 



saved the resources of its power from useless squandering and trans- 
formed vindictive enemies into friends. Will it be less respected? 
Nay, more, for it will have demonstrated its honesty at the sacrifice of 
false pride. Is this the first time that a powerful nation desisted from 
the subjugation of a weaker adversary? Have we not the example of 
England before us, who, after a seven years' war against the Ameri- 
can colonists, recognized their independence ? Indeed, the example 
of England teaches us a double lesson. England did not, by recog- 
nizing American independence, lose her position in the world and her 
chances of future greatness ; on the contrary, she grew in strength. 
And secondly, England would have retained, or won anew, the friend- 
ship of the Americans, if she had recognized American independ- 
ence more promptly, before appearing to have been forced to do so 
by humiliating defeats. Will our friends who are for Philippine 
independence, but also for continuing to kill those who fight for it, 
take these two lessons to heart ? 

Some of them say that we have here to fulfil some of the dis- 
agreeable duties of patriotism. Patriotism ! Who were the true patri- 
ots of England at the time of the American Revolution — King 
George and Lord North, who insisted upon subjugation; or Lord 
Chatham and Edmund Burke, who stood up for American rights and 
American liberty? 

Who were the true patriots of France when, recently, that ghastly 
farce of a military trial was enacted to sacrifice an innocent man for 
the honor of the French army and the prestige of the French repub- 
lic—who were the true French patriots, those who insisted that the 
hideous crime of an unjust condemnation must be persisted in, or 
those who bravely defied the cry of "traitor! " and struggled to undo 
the wrong, and thus to restore the French republic to the path of jus- 
tice and to the esteem of the world ? Who are the true patriots in 
America today— those who drag our republic, once so proud of its 
high principles and ideals, through the mire of broken pledges, vulgar 
ambitions and vanities and criminal aggressions — those who do violence 
to their own moral sense by insisting that, like the Dreyfus iniquity, a 
criminal course once begun must be persisted in, or those who, fear- 
less of the demagogue clamor, strive to make the flag of the republic 
once more what it once was — the flag of justice, liberty, and true civ- 
ilization, and to lift up the American people among the nations of the 
earth to the proud position of the people that have a conscience 
and obey it ? 

The country has these days highly and deservedly honored Ad- 
miral Dewey as a national hero. Who are his true friends — those who 
would desecrate Dewey's splendid achievement at Manila by making 
it the starting-point of criminal aggression, and thus the opening of a 
most disgraceful and inevitably disastrous chapter of American his- 
tory, to be remembered with sorrow, or those who strive so to shape 
the results of that brilliant feat of arms that it may stand in history 
not as a part of a treacherous conquest, but as a true victory of Amer- 
ican good faith in an honest war of liberation and humanity — to be 

2G 



proud of for all time, as Dewey himself no doubt meant it to be. 

I know the imperialists will say that I have been pleading here 
for Aguinaldo and his Filipinos against our republic. No — not for 
the Filipinos merely, although, as one of those who have grown gray in 
the struggle for free and honest government, I would never be ashamed 
to plead for the cause of freedom and independence, even when its ban- 
ner is carried by dusky and feeble hands. But I am pleading for 
more. I am pleading for the cause of American honor and self- 
respect, American interests, American democracy — aye, for the cause 
of the American people against an administration of our public affairs 
which has wantonly plunged this country into an iniquitous war; 
which has disgraced the republic by a scandalous breach of faith to a 
people struggling for their freedom whom we had used as allies ; which 
has been systematically seeking to deceive and mislead the public 
mind by the manufacture of false news ; which has struck at the very 
foundation of our constitutional government by an executive usurpa- 
tion of the war power; which makes sport of the great principles and 
high ideals that have been and should ever remain the guiding star of 
our course; and which, unless stopped in time, will transform this gov- 
ernment of the people, for the people, and by the people, into an 
imperial government cynically calling itself republican — a government 
in which the noisy worship of arrogant might will drown the voice of 
right; which will impose upon the people a burdensome and demoral- 
izing militarism, and which will be driven into a policy of wild and 
rapacious adventure by the unscrupulous greed of the exploiter — a 
policy always fatal to democracy. 

I plead the cause of the American people against all this, and I 
here declare my profound conviction that if this administration of our 
affairs were submitted for judgment to a popular vote on a clear issue, 
it would be condemned by an overwhelming majority. 

I confidently trust that the American people will prove them- 
selves too clear-headed not to appreciate the vital difference between ^ 
the expansion of the republic and its free institutions over contiguous 
territory and kindred populations, which we all gladly welcome if 
accomplished peaceably and honorably — and imperialism which 
reaches out for distant lands to be ruled as subject provinces ; too 
intelligent not to perceive that our very first step on the road of impe- 
rialism has been a betrayal of the fundamental principles of democ- 
racy, followed by disaster and disgrace; too enlightened not to under- 
stand that a monarchy may do such things and still remain a strong 
monarchy, while a democracy cannot do them and still remain a 
democracy ; too wise not to detect the false pride or the dangerous 
ambitions, or the selfish schemes which so often hide themselves under 
that deceptive cry of mock patriotism: "Our country, right or 
wrong!" They will not fail to recognize that our dignity, our free 
institutions, and the peace and welfare of this and coming genera- 
tions of Americans will be secure only as we cling to the watchword 
of true patriotism : " Our country — when right to be kept right ; 
when wrong to be put right." 

27 



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